I remain unhappy with Apple’s passkey backup story. There’s little documentation about this, but from what I can tell:

• There are no automatic versioned backups. (Syncing is not backup because it doesn’t protect you against human error, bugs, or attacks.)

• Even if you have a Time Machine backup, it’s not possible to restore it to the same Mac without logging into iCloud. This could be a problem if your account is locked or compromised.

• Restoring it to a different Mac is impossible because the decryption key is stored in the other Mac’s Secure Enclave. Apple is protecting you from accessing your own backup, even though the keychain is already an encrypted file, protected by the password that you set. (And the Time Machine or clone drive that it’s stored on is probably encrypted, too.)

• The Passwords app can now export passkeys, but you cannot create an export file that you can import back into Passwords on another Mac. You can only export to a third-party password manager that’s installed on the same Mac (which may require a working Apple account). Even then, this does not include passkeys for Apple services; they don’t show up in the Passwords app. There are also some other restrictions around shared items and Sign In with Apple.

The above is last year’s news, but I don’t think I had written it all in one place before. The new bad news is that, as of macOS 26.4, these problems now affect regular passwords, not just passkeys. (You do have more flexibility to export passwords, though.)

Rich Trouton (Hacker News):

Historically, you could copy the login keychain file from one Mac to another and be able to open it on the destination Mac by providing the password to that keychain. As of macOS Tahoe, this does not appear to work for Macs which use Secure Enclave.

[…]

From that, it appears that unlocking the login keychain requires more than the password because the keys it unlocks are tied to the Secure Enclave of the Mac where the keychain was created. With the decryption keys stored in the source Mac’s Secure Enclave, manually copying the keychain to another Mac and then unlocking it won’t work. The password you have for the keychain may be correct, but the actual keys needed to decrypt its contents won’t be available on the destination Mac.

Jeff Johnson:

According to Apple, all Apple silicon Macs, as well as some Intel Mac models, have the secure enclave processor, so the issue affects millions of Mac users.

[…]

If anything happens to your Mac, if it’s stolen or becomes inoperable, your login keychain is also lost, unrecoverable, even if you have a copy of the login keychain file! This is a stunning development that has left me bewildered and irate. WTF was Apple thinking? To my knowledge, Apple did not even publicize the change in Tahoe.

[…]

How does Migration Assistant handle the situation on Tahoe? I don’t know. I would guess that since Migration Assistant still has access to the old Mac, it simply decrypts the old login keychain and copies the login keychain entries to the new login keychain on the new Mac, rather than transferring the keychain files directly.

[…]

I recommend that you open your login keychain with the Keychain Access app (now located in /System/Library/CoreServices/Applications) and check what’s in there, the data that you’re in danger of losing. Whether you realize or it not, many apps use the login keychain. For example, Google Chrome and other Chromium browsers store passwords in the login keychain. MailMate stores email account passwords in the login keychain. The open source RSS reader Vienna stores website passwords in the login keychain. The Zoom app also uses the login keychain. My Developer ID code signing certificate is stored in the login keychain; if I’m not mistaken, I believe that Apple’s own Xcode put it there. And of course, any items that you’ve manually added to the login keychain would be lost if the keychain file could not be unlocked.

Howard Oakley:

I have confirmed that a login.keychain-db copied from my Mac mini M4 Pro to a virtual machine (VM) running macOS Tahoe 26.6.2 cannot reveal any of its secrets to the Keychain Access app on the VM, as it refuses to accept the valid password. Not only that, but Keychain Access running in a VM cannot access the login.keychain-db keychain copied from another Tahoe VM, although neither has been anywhere near a Secure Enclave.

If you intend migrating manually between Macs, don’t waste time trying to copy across the login keychain, as it’s not likely to work, and its secrets will remain.

[…]

I performed test migrations between VMs, and demonstrated that Migration Assistant does copy the contents of the login keychain successfully to the destination Mac.

I think this only happens if you migrate over a network, with the old Mac acting as a server. I prefer to connect the old Mac using Target Disk Mode, but in that case Migration Assistant wouldn’t be running on the old Mac so the special sauce wouldn’t work. Likewise if I were trying to do the migration using a third-party cloning app.

Howard Oakley:

• Loss of physical access to a Mac running 26.4 or later prevents access to any items stored in its login keychain.
• Hardware failure requiring logic board replacement may have the same effect on restoring the contents of its login keychain (assuming that migration from a backup doesn’t work).
• Restoring an Apple silicon Mac in DFU mode may be similar in effect.

What I don’t know yet is whether you can unlock and access any login keychain written by macOS 26.4 or later and migrated from a backup accessed directly from a different Mac. This would occur in one-Mac migration, when Migration Assistant uses a backup of a Mac not acting as a Migration server. This would only be possible if the backup also stored the additional secret required to access the login keychain, which seems unlikely.

[…]

Apple’s documentation for macOS Tahoe and the copying of keychains makes no mention of this change, in spite of its serious consequences and the change being made almost six months ago.

It there states “If you didn’t use Setup Assistant, the best way to copy your keychains to a new computer is to export and then import them using Keychain Access”. However, Keychain Access can only export some keychain items including certificates and keys, but not passwords. And to do that, the Mac must be able to unlock and access those items in the source keychain. Thus, Apple’s recommendations are out of date and will now fail.

rsUSA0 (via Jeff Johnson):

When upgrading to macos 27 Golden Gate, I erased my system through recovery to do a clean install. I planned to manually migrate data back to the computer from an external drive clone of Macintosh HD and a Time Machine backup. This has worked well in the past and eliminated system bloat.

When I manually migrated my login keychain, it opened, showed entries, but it wouldn’t accept my password to reveal any actual passwords. The window shakes like I’m using the wrong password. I’m 100% sure I’m using the correct password. I also tried every password I’ve ever used and I’m certain it’s not a password issue.

Perhaps even restoring to the same Mac failed because the clean install wiped the key stored in the Secure Enclave. [Update (2026-10-01): See update below.]

Jeff Johnson:

Some people who read my previous blog post misunderstood the issue, because they didn’t know that the macOS login keychain is distinct from iCloud Keychain.

[…]

In the Keychain Access app, you can see two separate default keychains, one of which is the login keychain. The other default keychain is named “iCloud” if you’ve enabled iCloud Keychain, “Local Items” if not. There’s actually a longstanding issue with this keychain analogous to the newer issue with the login keychain.

[…]

Mac users like myself who forsake iCloud Keychain face the prospect of no disaster recovery for the Local Items keychain. My habit is to manually create a new password item in the login keychain and only then supply the credentials to an app, for example, Safari AutoFill. Ironically, the login keychain change brought by macOS 26.4 sabotages my password backup procedure[…]

jen1x:

Today, I got my new Mac mini M6. When I started setting up the new machine, it asked me to update to macOS 27, so I followed the instructions.

[…]

After signing in to iCloud, it asked me to enter the passcode of one of my Apple devices. I entered the correct passcode and even tried the passcodes for all of my devices, but I keep getting the same message:

Verification Failed
There was an error verifying the passcode of your iPhone

I don’t like having to rely on iCloud.

Previously:

• SuperDuper’s “Follow-Up”
• macOS 26.4
• 2025 Six Colors Apple Report Card
• Locked Out of Apple Account Due to Gift Card
• Downloading Xcode With a Passkey
• iOS and iCloud Keychain Are Hostile to Backups
• Passkeys Credential Exchange
• Passkeys: A Loss of User Control?
• Fixing iCloud Keychains, and Backing Them Up

Update (2026-10-01): TN3137 has been updated for macOS 26.4:

Historically each file-based keychain was a standalone file. You could, for example, copy a keychain file from one Mac to another and still use it, as long as you knew the keychain password.

In macOS 26.4 and later that’s no longer the case. A keychain file might reference a protected entropy file. To unlock such a keychain you need both the keychain password and the protected entropy file.

[…]

These protected entropy files are stored in /var/db/SystemKeys. If you’re creating a backup product, make sure to back up that directory. Without it, the keychain files that you back up might be useless.

[…]

The /var/db/SystemKeys directory is not directly accessible, even when running as root, so you can’t copy a protected entropy file in the normal way. To access it, disable System Integrity Protection (SIP).

First things first: I don’t think turning off SIP every time you make a backup is a real solution. And I don’t understand what problem Apple is really trying to solve with protecting the entropy file; it seems like they don’t trust their own encryption. Lastly, it’s not explicitly stated, but I don’t think copying the entropy file helps with backing up passkeys.

That aside, I find the details both illuminating and confusing. This probably explains the rsUSA0 case above, where restoring to the same Mac didn’t work. The key wasn’t stored in the Secure Enclave but rather in the entropy file on the SSD, which had been wiped. This also suggests a simpler way for Migration Assistant to work; it could have special access to copy the entropy file without having to actually open the keychain.

It also seems to be saying that, if you turn off SIP and copy the entropy file, you can then access your keychain backup from another Mac. But I’m not sure how to square that with Apple’s keychain documentation:

Keychain items are encrypted using two different AES-256-GCM keys: a table key (metadata) and a per-row key (secret key). Keychain metadata (all attributes other than kSecValue) is encrypted with the metadata key to speed searches, and the secret value (kSecValueData) is encrypted with the secret key. The metadata key is protected by the Secure Enclave but is cached in the Application Processor to allow fast queries of the keychain. The secret key always requires a round trip through the Secure Enclave.

How can copying the entropy file work if the Secure Enclave is required? My guess is that the entropy file itself is encrypted (NSFileProtection) using the Secure Enclave. So accessing it on the original Mac does require going through the Secure Enclave. But when you make a backup, the entropy file gets decrypted. Maybe accessing the keychain on the second Mac causes file protection to be re-applied to the contents of /var/db/SystemKeys, so then it becomes protected by that Mac’s Secure Enclave.

Previously:

• Accessing the Keychain Without the Password

Update (2026-10-02): Dave Nanian (Mastodon):

This is obviously not a good user solution, because no one is going to boot to Recovery, turn off SIP, back up, boot back to Recovery, and turn SIP back on. Thinking they would do so is kind of crazy.

[…]

SuperDuper handles this situation. When you make a bootable copy, the required keys are copied without requiring any special steps.

SuperDuper itself can’t read the entropy file, but it uses Apple’s asr tool to make bootable backups, and that has special access. (Unfortunately, it can’t update the entropy file without making a fresh bootable backup, but in practice I don’t expect it to need updating.) I had not been bothering to make most of my backups bootable, since in most cases I just want to restore to an internal SSD, not actually boot from the backup. But I now think it makes sense to choose bootable backups as the default.

Howard Oakley (Rich Trouton):

I won’t expand on my feelings any further than by saying that in my 37 years as an Apple developer, I have never come across anything so shameful.

Unfortunately, it seems like the keychain stuff was just the warm-up act.

Update (2026-10-05): Howard Oakley:

[macOS 26.4] Added the protected directory at /var/db/SystemKeys to backups of Data volumes, and protects them in backups.

So Time Machine does back up the entropy file. I missed this because I didn’t see /var/db in my backups, but it turns out that they do have /private/var/db/SystemKeys and are just missing the /var symlink.

Update (2026-10-07): Jeff Johnson:

The -s option to the security show-keychain-info is not yet documented in man security, not even on the latest version of macOS Golden Gate. Moreover, the -s option does not work on macOS Sequoia and earlier. In general, the security show-keychain-info command reveals no information unless the specified keychain is unlocked, which makes it impossible to discover the salt of a keychain file that you can’t currently unlock. However, as long as you already have the entire contents of the /var/db/SystemKeys directory from the macOS volume on which a keychain file was created, the inability to determine the keychain file’s salt beforehand shouldn’t be much of a problem, because in practice there are typically only a few salt files, so you can simply copy them all to another macOS volume.

[…]

You don’t actually have to disable SIP to add files to the /var/db/SystemKeys directory, because you can do so from another boot volume. You have to boot into recovery anyway in order to disable SIP, so you could simply edit /var/db/SystemKeys from recovery rather than disabling SIP on the non-recovery volume.

The security unlock-keychain command lacks an option to specify the location of an entropy file or to provide the file data directly, so unfortunately a login keychain can’t be unlocked from the recovery volume, only from a volume where you can add files to the /var/db/SystemKeys directory.

C’est un coup de tonnerre dans le silence de l’espace. Les États-Unis viennent d’affirmer qu’ils disposent d’armes en orbite. Une annonce qui fait immédiatement réagir la Russie et la Chine. Mais de quoi s’agit-il et pourquoi cette annonce marque l’entrée dans une nouvelle ère.

The virtual character, which is promoting its upcoming movie Misaligned, tries to evade politics by repetitively commenting on the clothes you’re wearing.

Quelque 66 milliards d'arbres plantés depuis 1978, 34 milliards supplémentaires prévus d'ici 2050. Les forêts issues de ce programme chinois poussent 66 % plus vite que les forêts naturelles. Un résultat qui semble valider la stratégie, jusqu'à ce qu'on regarde ce qui se passe ensuite.

Omarchy is a new curated Linux distribution that offers a pre-configured keyboard driven environment and window manager. It’s lightweight and highly customizable, with system integrated AI tools, making for a unique take on operating systems. With Omarchy gaining quite a bit of attention, you might be curious in giving Omarchy a test run, but perhaps ... Read More

The post How to Try Omarchy Linux on a Mac, Without Installing Linux appeared first on OS X Daily.

Dave Nanian:

Recent versions of xOS (that is, macOS, iOS, iPadOS, etc) have Data Protection Classes from A to D that get assigned to files and folders.

[…]

The thing is, though, is that these files and folders are inaccessible unless the user is logged in, and the screen is unlocked. A few seconds after the screen locks (or you log out), the keys are purged, and they cannot be read.

[…]

That means the files any application considers to be worth protection cannot be accessed when a backup usually happens.

[…]

You may have noticed that if you had an overnight backup, when you unlock your screen, a copy starts to run. It’s typically quite brief, thanks to ⚡️Turbo Smart Update, but it might surprise you anyway. […] During your overnight copy, SuperDuper kept track of the files that it couldn’t access due to their protection class. And now that it can access them, it’s making sure they get backed up.

This seems like the right thing to do. Time Machine also does it. A backup app should try to make as faithful a backup as possible. I kind of find it annoying, though. Sometimes it can’t do a Turbo Smart Update, and so the backup that should already be done may end up taking another 30 minutes or more. The best thing to do is schedule backups while you’re using your Mac to avoid SuperDuper needing to do such “follow-ups.”

I wrote some code to try to figure out which files I have that are using data protection. Interestingly, the URLFileProtection API seems to not work on macOS. I used the lower level getattrlist() instead. Nanian recommends fcntl(). I didn’t find any protected files that I actually care about, just caches and derived data from Apple’s own apps. But, in theory, Apple or a third-party app could be saving actual user data using data protection.

Previously:

• SuperDuper 4
• Launching Before UserDefaults Is Available
• Apple Addresses iOS Surveillance and Forensics Vulnerabilities

Howard Oakley:

Since High Sierra and APFS snapshots, accounting for purgeable space has been inconsistent and often misleading. I first reported this over eight years ago in Sierra 10.12.6 and High Sierra 10.13.3, and most recently three years ago in Ventura 13.3.1. This article looks at how this is handled now in Tahoe 26.6.2.

[…]

There is disappointingly little documentation on space management in macOS, and the closest Apple comes to defining purgeable space is in Disk Utility’s Help pages, where it’s stated to be “space that macOS can free up when needed by removing files from your computer (you can’t manually remove the files that are designated purgeable, but macOS removes them as space is required)”.

On the face of it, that includes cache files but not snapshots, as they can be manually removed in Disk Utility, as I’ve discussed in detail here. This is contradicted when using tmutil localsnapshot to make Time Machine snapshots, which reports that “local snapshots are considered purgeable and may be removed at any time by deleted(8)”, as deleted is the purgeable space and cache management service in macOS.

APFS snapshots can also be created by third-party apps that have the appropriate restricted entitlement. Apple doesn’t explain whether those too can be purged by macOS when additional free space is required.

Howard Oakley:

Before macOS will start copying a file to a volume, it checks whether there’s sufficient free space available. I believe this is normally performed by the FileCoordinator API in Foundation, and appears in the log with the subsystem com.apple.foundation.filecoordination.

If there isn’t sufficient free space to accommodate the file to be copied, deleted in the subsystem com.apple.cache_delete checks whether enough space can be freed by purging items known to be purgeable in the destination volume. deleted has a fixed set of services that can be called on to purge items, listed in /System/Library/CacheDelete.

[…]

Space-based purging of Time Machine local snapshots is unreliable. The reason for this is that Time Machine CacheDelete fails to report purgeable space when it’s available. Even when it does work, it can take nearly half an hour for Time Machine CacheDelete to recognise the appearance of purgeable space.

Sometimes you need to do it yourself with Disk Utility.

Previously:

• SuperDuper 4
• Tahoe Free Space Problems
• Purgeable Disk Space
• Purgeable Mac Apps
• Time Machine Evolution and APFS
• What You See in the Finder Should Always Be Correct
• Quantum Computing and APFS: Free and Used Space
• How OmniDiskSweeper Reports Free Space
• Local Time Machine Uses APFS Snapshots

Update (2026-09-03): Howard Oakley:

• When purgeable space is required, deleted (subsystem com.apple.cache_delete) first discovers purgeable space for each caching service, to determine whether it’s sufficient.
• If it is, and the decision is taken to purge caches, caching services are called on to free up space by purging their caches as required.
• Purging may then take place in phases until sufficient space has been freed.
• Purging is frequent during installation of macOS updates, even when there’s ample free space available.

Update (2026-09-08): Howard Oakley:

In the event that you’re caught out by circumstances, such as the combination of recent large snapshots and exceptionally large caches, macOS does try to manage as well as possible even when there’s just a few GB free. But once free space falls to around 1 GB you should see a warning notification.

[…]

From then on, most file operations, even creating a new folder, will fail. That applies to all apps, regardless of whether they handle those failures gracefully and warn you of the error. Actions like taking a screenshot start normally, but after their image has floated across the display, they just vanish and can’t be saved.

[…]

The worst combination of problems occurs when a Mac runs out of free disk space and physical memory at the same time. macOS memory management then wants to allocate space in the VM volume as its backing store for virtual memory, but in the absence of free space to do so, that fails and should propagate as a memory allocation error.

Update (2026-09-09): See also: Accidental Tech Podcast.

Dans quelques jours, une nouvelle sonde spatiale va partir en direction de la Lune. Pas encore une mission habitée, mais une étape supplémentaire décisive pour la Chine qui vise cette fois le pôle sud de notre satellite.

If you’re curious about testing out MacOS 27 Golden Gate beta but you aren’t ready for the full commitment of installing it as your primary operating system, the simplest and safest way to run MacOS 27 Golden Gate beta is within a virtual machine. While one of our authors dove right into MacOS 27 Golden ... Read More

The post How to Make a MacOS 27 Golden Gate Virtual Machine with VirtualBuddy appeared first on OS X Daily.

Apple:

In macOS 28 and later, the Mac OS Extended file system format will be supported only for volumes (disks and other storage devices) that aren’t encrypted. For future macOS compatibility, either decrypt or reformat any encrypted Mac OS Extended volumes.

I think Apple removed the user interface for creating such volumes way back in Big Sur. It’s not really surprising that they’re going away, although only offering a year of warnings seems rather aggressive. Many people delay updating to major OS versions or wait until they get a new Mac. There will be users that switch to a Mac that can only run macOS 28 and get rid of their old one before realizing that some drive they haven’t connected in a while won’t mount.

The other surprising part is that Apple’s options—reformat or decrypt—are not great. During the initial transition to APFS, macOS would transparently convert an encrypted HFS+ boot volume to encrypted APFS without rewriting any data. This functionality is nominally still available via the diskutil apfs convert command, but Apple hasn’t mentioned this or built an automatic upgrader GUI.

[Decrypting] doesn’t apply to encrypted Time Machine backup disks.

It’s obvious why. The old Time Machine format with hard links is totally different from the new one based on APFS snapshots. But this means that you’ll either need to buy a new Time Machine drive for use with macOS 28 or delete your backup history. Even if you keep the old drive, you’ll need an older boot drive or an old Mac in order to be able to access it.

Previously:

• Searching Time Machine Backups and Versions
• macOS 27 Golden Gate Announced
• macOS 27 to Drop Support for AirPort and Time Capsule Backups
• Removing Unwanted APFS Time Machine Backups
• Should You Continue Using HFS+?
• Time Machine Evolution and APFS
• SuperDuper 3.3 for Catalina
• APFS to be Mandatory for SSDs in High Sierra

Update (2026-07-24): Marcus Mendes:

Apple has now revised the page to add a third option, allowing users to convert an encrypted HFS+ volume directly to encrypted APFS without decrypting it first.

[…]

The company has also removed its previous instructions for decrypting the volume first, converting it to APFS without erasing it, and then optionally re-encrypting it.

Hammer:

Ignore Apple’s guidance and do not use Convert to APFS in Disk Utility for disk images.

The first encrypted HFS+ disk image I tried to convert that way failed and left me with an unusable disk image. If I didn’t have backups I’d have lost its contents.

It didn’t corrupt the disk images that I tried, but it didn’t work, either, instead failing with an error about expecting a GPT partitioning scheme.

Update (2026-07-28): Howard Oakley:

As encrypted disk images have never used CoreStorage, withdrawal of support for that has no impact on the continued use of any form of encrypted disk image, including those using HFS+ as their virtual file system.

This is a good point. Apple’s support page refers to “encrypted Mac OS Extended disks,” but the developer release notes refer to CoreStorage specifically. So this shouldn’t affect most encrypted disk images, which show up in Finder as unencrypted after mounting. The encryption is at the disk image level rather than at the file system level. However, I’m not sure that all encrypted disk images are safe. Presumably, a device image, which directly copies the blocks rather than the files, would still use CoreStorage.

Howard Oakley:

Spotlight doesn’t currently appear able to search Time Machine backups reliably, at least not in Sequoia or Tahoe, although this may not be universal.

[…]

If I now step back through my backups to reach one that I know contains that file, I can restore it. But if I type anything into the search field, nothing is found. If I change the scope of the search to that backup, the window title changes but its contents remain blank, and there isn’t even a busy spinner to indicate a search is in progress.

[…]

As I can’t disable Spotlight indexing on that volume without macOS telling me that it’s required to be indexed by Spotlight, neither can I force that volume to be reindexed.

[…]

My conclusion is that using Spotlight to search Time Machine backups no longer works, and the instructions given by Apple are also broken.

That has been my experience, too. As I see it, there are four separate problems:

1. I want to be able to search all my backup snapshots, because I don’t know which one might contain the file I want to restore. Time Machine only lets you search one at a time.
2. Searching an individual snapshot doesn’t actually work.
3. Spotlight indexing is invasive, using lots of CPU time, and with spinning hard drives causes wear and tear and creates lots of noise. If search doesn’t work anyway, I’d like to turn it off, but macOS won’t let me.
4. If the problem is with the index, there’s no way to reset it without deleting your backup.

Howard Oakley:

Unfortunately, all those saved versions in the version database fall outside the scope of Spotlight indexing, and Spotlight search can’t look inside any of the old versions saved in a volume’s version database. Surprisingly, the version browser doesn’t offer any search facilities either, as that’s presumably another feature intended for a future that never came.

[…]

One way around this is to save each document version as a separate file, allow Spotlight to extract their contents and add those to its indexes for that volume, then to search those files. This is quick and simple using my free utility Versatility.

Previously:

• Golden Gate Spotlight
• Time Machine in Tahoe
• Runaway Spotlight With Pages Document on iCloud Drive
• Spotlight Indexing Running Wild
• Invasive Spotlight Indexing
• You Can’t Turn Off Spotlight on Your Time Machine Backup

Pékin travaille à un vaste programme d’investissement estimé à 2 000 milliards de yuans, soit environ 295 milliards de dollars, destiné à développer un réseau national de centres de données consacrés à l’intelligence artificielle.

The Steam Machine is almost here. Valve chose possibly the worst time to announce new PC gaming hardware in late 2025, just as the AI boom sent storage and RAM prices through the roof. The upheaval delayed its new Steam Machine release, but Valve has announced its TV-friendly gaming PC will go on sale June 29 with a reservation-based system and a starting price of $1,049.

The Steam Machine will come in two variations: one with 512GB of storage and a more expensive one with 2TB. They'll retail for $1,049 and $1,349, respectively, and you'll be able to bundle a Steam Controller with either for an additional $79. Buying the 2TB model also gets you a pair of exclusive faceplates with red fabric and walnut finishes. Like the Steam Deck, the machine ships with the Linux-based SteamOS.

Both versions of the Steam Machine will run on a custom six-core AMD Zen 4 CPU with a peak clock speed of 4.8GHz. The integrated AMD RDNA3 GPU will feature 28 compute units and 8GB of dedicated DDR6 VRAM soldered to the board. The system will have its own 16GB allotment of DDR5 on the board. This should provide enough oomph (with upscaling tech) to play moderately demanding PC games on your TV.

Read full article

Comments

© Valve

Les Français sont de vrais « jardinophiles » ! Et vous ? Avec cette chronique, (re)découvrez une plante, un fruit, un légume. Si certaines plantes séduisent par leur feuillage, leurs fleurs ou leurs fruits, rares sont les espèces capables de surprendre à chaque saison. Le Clerodendrum...

À Pékin et à Shenzhen, des robots humanoïdes dopés à l’intelligence artificielle sont testés dans des logements privés. Encore lents, maladroits et accompagnés par des humains, ces assistants mécaniques servent autant à nettoyer qu’à collecter les données indispensables à la prochaine génération...

Et si une simple tasse de thé contribuait à vieillir en meilleure santé ? Selon une nouvelle revue scientifique, cette boisson pourrait aider à protéger le cœur, le cerveau et même les muscles. À condition toutefois de choisir le bon type de thé et d'éviter certains produits qui pourraient en...

Face à l’explosion des besoins de calcul liés à l’intelligence artificielle, la Chine a mis en exploitation un data center sous-marin présenté comme le premier au monde à être alimenté par un parc éolien offshore, ce qui réduit la dépendance à l'eau douce et aux énergies fossiles.

L’expansion navale chinoise continue à un rythme soutenu, portée par une multiplication de nouveaux bâtiments souvent découverts grâce aux images satellites. Cette fois, c’est un appareil à la silhouette inhabituelle qui attire l’attention des observateurs et soulève de nombreuses questions sur...