The risks and rewards of removing Apple Intelligence to reclaim storage storage space space are debated, along with some experiences of performance problems following macOS upgrades. They investigate reports of iPhone 18 Pro Max failures on AT&T, debating whether hardware, software, or carrier networks are responsible. The conversation concludes with new, expanded iCloud+ email alias options, custom domains, and the advantages of owning a personal domain. 

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I remain unhappy with Apple’s passkey backup story. There’s little documentation about this, but from what I can tell:

• There are no automatic versioned backups. (Syncing is not backup because it doesn’t protect you against human error, bugs, or attacks.)

• Even if you have a Time Machine backup, it’s not possible to restore it to the same Mac without logging into iCloud. This could be a problem if your account is locked or compromised.

• Restoring it to a different Mac is impossible because the decryption key is stored in the other Mac’s Secure Enclave. Apple is protecting you from accessing your own backup, even though the keychain is already an encrypted file, protected by the password that you set. (And the Time Machine or clone drive that it’s stored on is probably encrypted, too.)

• The Passwords app can now export passkeys, but you cannot create an export file that you can import back into Passwords on another Mac. You can only export to a third-party password manager that’s installed on the same Mac (which may require a working Apple account). Even then, this does not include passkeys for Apple services; they don’t show up in the Passwords app. There are also some other restrictions around shared items and Sign In with Apple.

The above is last year’s news, but I don’t think I had written it all in one place before. The new bad news is that, as of macOS 26.4, these problems now affect regular passwords, not just passkeys. (You do have more flexibility to export passwords, though.)

Rich Trouton (Hacker News):

Historically, you could copy the login keychain file from one Mac to another and be able to open it on the destination Mac by providing the password to that keychain. As of macOS Tahoe, this does not appear to work for Macs which use Secure Enclave.

[…]

From that, it appears that unlocking the login keychain requires more than the password because the keys it unlocks are tied to the Secure Enclave of the Mac where the keychain was created. With the decryption keys stored in the source Mac’s Secure Enclave, manually copying the keychain to another Mac and then unlocking it won’t work. The password you have for the keychain may be correct, but the actual keys needed to decrypt its contents won’t be available on the destination Mac.

Jeff Johnson:

According to Apple, all Apple silicon Macs, as well as some Intel Mac models, have the secure enclave processor, so the issue affects millions of Mac users.

[…]

If anything happens to your Mac, if it’s stolen or becomes inoperable, your login keychain is also lost, unrecoverable, even if you have a copy of the login keychain file! This is a stunning development that has left me bewildered and irate. WTF was Apple thinking? To my knowledge, Apple did not even publicize the change in Tahoe.

[…]

How does Migration Assistant handle the situation on Tahoe? I don’t know. I would guess that since Migration Assistant still has access to the old Mac, it simply decrypts the old login keychain and copies the login keychain entries to the new login keychain on the new Mac, rather than transferring the keychain files directly.

[…]

I recommend that you open your login keychain with the Keychain Access app (now located in /System/Library/CoreServices/Applications) and check what’s in there, the data that you’re in danger of losing. Whether you realize or it not, many apps use the login keychain. For example, Google Chrome and other Chromium browsers store passwords in the login keychain. MailMate stores email account passwords in the login keychain. The open source RSS reader Vienna stores website passwords in the login keychain. The Zoom app also uses the login keychain. My Developer ID code signing certificate is stored in the login keychain; if I’m not mistaken, I believe that Apple’s own Xcode put it there. And of course, any items that you’ve manually added to the login keychain would be lost if the keychain file could not be unlocked.

Howard Oakley:

I have confirmed that a login.keychain-db copied from my Mac mini M4 Pro to a virtual machine (VM) running macOS Tahoe 26.6.2 cannot reveal any of its secrets to the Keychain Access app on the VM, as it refuses to accept the valid password. Not only that, but Keychain Access running in a VM cannot access the login.keychain-db keychain copied from another Tahoe VM, although neither has been anywhere near a Secure Enclave.

If you intend migrating manually between Macs, don’t waste time trying to copy across the login keychain, as it’s not likely to work, and its secrets will remain.

[…]

I performed test migrations between VMs, and demonstrated that Migration Assistant does copy the contents of the login keychain successfully to the destination Mac.

I think this only happens if you migrate over a network, with the old Mac acting as a server. I prefer to connect the old Mac using Target Disk Mode, but in that case Migration Assistant wouldn’t be running on the old Mac so the special sauce wouldn’t work. Likewise if I were trying to do the migration using a third-party cloning app.

Howard Oakley:

• Loss of physical access to a Mac running 26.4 or later prevents access to any items stored in its login keychain.
• Hardware failure requiring logic board replacement may have the same effect on restoring the contents of its login keychain (assuming that migration from a backup doesn’t work).
• Restoring an Apple silicon Mac in DFU mode may be similar in effect.

What I don’t know yet is whether you can unlock and access any login keychain written by macOS 26.4 or later and migrated from a backup accessed directly from a different Mac. This would occur in one-Mac migration, when Migration Assistant uses a backup of a Mac not acting as a Migration server. This would only be possible if the backup also stored the additional secret required to access the login keychain, which seems unlikely.

[…]

Apple’s documentation for macOS Tahoe and the copying of keychains makes no mention of this change, in spite of its serious consequences and the change being made almost six months ago.

It there states “If you didn’t use Setup Assistant, the best way to copy your keychains to a new computer is to export and then import them using Keychain Access”. However, Keychain Access can only export some keychain items including certificates and keys, but not passwords. And to do that, the Mac must be able to unlock and access those items in the source keychain. Thus, Apple’s recommendations are out of date and will now fail.

rsUSA0 (via Jeff Johnson):

When upgrading to macos 27 Golden Gate, I erased my system through recovery to do a clean install. I planned to manually migrate data back to the computer from an external drive clone of Macintosh HD and a Time Machine backup. This has worked well in the past and eliminated system bloat.

When I manually migrated my login keychain, it opened, showed entries, but it wouldn’t accept my password to reveal any actual passwords. The window shakes like I’m using the wrong password. I’m 100% sure I’m using the correct password. I also tried every password I’ve ever used and I’m certain it’s not a password issue.

Perhaps even restoring to the same Mac failed because the clean install wiped the key stored in the Secure Enclave. [Update (2026-10-01): See update below.]

Jeff Johnson:

Some people who read my previous blog post misunderstood the issue, because they didn’t know that the macOS login keychain is distinct from iCloud Keychain.

[…]

In the Keychain Access app, you can see two separate default keychains, one of which is the login keychain. The other default keychain is named “iCloud” if you’ve enabled iCloud Keychain, “Local Items” if not. There’s actually a longstanding issue with this keychain analogous to the newer issue with the login keychain.

[…]

Mac users like myself who forsake iCloud Keychain face the prospect of no disaster recovery for the Local Items keychain. My habit is to manually create a new password item in the login keychain and only then supply the credentials to an app, for example, Safari AutoFill. Ironically, the login keychain change brought by macOS 26.4 sabotages my password backup procedure[…]

jen1x:

Today, I got my new Mac mini M6. When I started setting up the new machine, it asked me to update to macOS 27, so I followed the instructions.

[…]

After signing in to iCloud, it asked me to enter the passcode of one of my Apple devices. I entered the correct passcode and even tried the passcodes for all of my devices, but I keep getting the same message:

Verification Failed
There was an error verifying the passcode of your iPhone

I don’t like having to rely on iCloud.

Previously:

• SuperDuper’s “Follow-Up”
• macOS 26.4
• 2025 Six Colors Apple Report Card
• Locked Out of Apple Account Due to Gift Card
• Downloading Xcode With a Passkey
• iOS and iCloud Keychain Are Hostile to Backups
• Passkeys Credential Exchange
• Passkeys: A Loss of User Control?
• Fixing iCloud Keychains, and Backing Them Up

Update (2026-10-01): TN3137 has been updated for macOS 26.4:

Historically each file-based keychain was a standalone file. You could, for example, copy a keychain file from one Mac to another and still use it, as long as you knew the keychain password.

In macOS 26.4 and later that’s no longer the case. A keychain file might reference a protected entropy file. To unlock such a keychain you need both the keychain password and the protected entropy file.

[…]

These protected entropy files are stored in /var/db/SystemKeys. If you’re creating a backup product, make sure to back up that directory. Without it, the keychain files that you back up might be useless.

[…]

The /var/db/SystemKeys directory is not directly accessible, even when running as root, so you can’t copy a protected entropy file in the normal way. To access it, disable System Integrity Protection (SIP).

First things first: I don’t think turning off SIP every time you make a backup is a real solution. And I don’t understand what problem Apple is really trying to solve with protecting the entropy file; it seems like they don’t trust their own encryption. Lastly, it’s not explicitly stated, but I don’t think copying the entropy file helps with backing up passkeys.

That aside, I find the details both illuminating and confusing. This probably explains the rsUSA0 case above, where restoring to the same Mac didn’t work. The key wasn’t stored in the Secure Enclave but rather in the entropy file on the SSD, which had been wiped. This also suggests a simpler way for Migration Assistant to work; it could have special access to copy the entropy file without having to actually open the keychain.

It also seems to be saying that, if you turn off SIP and copy the entropy file, you can then access your keychain backup from another Mac. But I’m not sure how to square that with Apple’s keychain documentation:

Keychain items are encrypted using two different AES-256-GCM keys: a table key (metadata) and a per-row key (secret key). Keychain metadata (all attributes other than kSecValue) is encrypted with the metadata key to speed searches, and the secret value (kSecValueData) is encrypted with the secret key. The metadata key is protected by the Secure Enclave but is cached in the Application Processor to allow fast queries of the keychain. The secret key always requires a round trip through the Secure Enclave.

How can copying the entropy file work if the Secure Enclave is required? My guess is that the entropy file itself is encrypted (NSFileProtection) using the Secure Enclave. So accessing it on the original Mac does require going through the Secure Enclave. But when you make a backup, the entropy file gets decrypted. Maybe accessing the keychain on the second Mac causes file protection to be re-applied to the contents of /var/db/SystemKeys, so then it becomes protected by that Mac’s Secure Enclave.

Previously:

• Accessing the Keychain Without the Password

Update (2026-10-02): Dave Nanian (Mastodon):

This is obviously not a good user solution, because no one is going to boot to Recovery, turn off SIP, back up, boot back to Recovery, and turn SIP back on. Thinking they would do so is kind of crazy.

[…]

SuperDuper handles this situation. When you make a bootable copy, the required keys are copied without requiring any special steps.

SuperDuper itself can’t read the entropy file, but it uses Apple’s asr tool to make bootable backups, and that has special access. (Unfortunately, it can’t update the entropy file without making a fresh bootable backup, but in practice I don’t expect it to need updating.) I had not been bothering to make most of my backups bootable, since in most cases I just want to restore to an internal SSD, not actually boot from the backup. But I now think it makes sense to choose bootable backups as the default.

Howard Oakley (Rich Trouton):

I won’t expand on my feelings any further than by saying that in my 37 years as an Apple developer, I have never come across anything so shameful.

Unfortunately, it seems like the keychain stuff was just the warm-up act.

Update (2026-10-05): Howard Oakley:

[macOS 26.4] Added the protected directory at /var/db/SystemKeys to backups of Data volumes, and protects them in backups.

So Time Machine does back up the entropy file. I missed this because I didn’t see /var/db in my backups, but it turns out that they do have /private/var/db/SystemKeys and are just missing the /var symlink.

Update (2026-10-07): Jeff Johnson:

The -s option to the security show-keychain-info is not yet documented in man security, not even on the latest version of macOS Golden Gate. Moreover, the -s option does not work on macOS Sequoia and earlier. In general, the security show-keychain-info command reveals no information unless the specified keychain is unlocked, which makes it impossible to discover the salt of a keychain file that you can’t currently unlock. However, as long as you already have the entire contents of the /var/db/SystemKeys directory from the macOS volume on which a keychain file was created, the inability to determine the keychain file’s salt beforehand shouldn’t be much of a problem, because in practice there are typically only a few salt files, so you can simply copy them all to another macOS volume.

[…]

You don’t actually have to disable SIP to add files to the /var/db/SystemKeys directory, because you can do so from another boot volume. You have to boot into recovery anyway in order to disable SIP, so you could simply edit /var/db/SystemKeys from recovery rather than disabling SIP on the non-recovery volume.

The security unlock-keychain command lacks an option to specify the location of an entropy file or to provide the file data directly, so unfortunately a login keychain can’t be unlocked from the recovery volume, only from a volume where you can add files to the /var/db/SystemKeys directory.

Apple:

iPhone Handoff lets you use one phone number between two devices, so you can switch between them whenever you want. It makes it easy to move back and forth between devices optimized for the moment — like weekday business or weekend adventures.

[…]

After iPhone Handoff is set up, one iPhone becomes the main iPhone and the other iPhone becomes the secondary iPhone that shares the number. Your main iPhone should be the one you use most often. Some carrier services, like Call Forwarding and Caller ID, and carrier account management can only be managed on your main iPhone. Contact your carrier for more details.

To move between your main iPhone and secondary iPhone, simply unlock the device that you want to start using — your phone number will automatically become active on that device.

[…]

iPhone Handoff works with Dual SIM as long as both eSIMs are from carriers that support iPhone Handoff. Once set up, both eSIMs switch together simultaneously when you unlock your iPhone.

They say you need to have Messages in iCloud enabled.

Joe Rossignol:

In addition to needing two iPhones running iOS 27, “iPhone Handoff” will seemingly require carrier support. The forum post mentions that T-Mobile in the U.S. and Deutsche Telekom in Germany might be among the first carriers to offer the feature.

T-Mobile:

T‑Mobile is introducing the feature at $5/month.

John Gruber:

This seems like a ridiculous thing to charge for. It’s not adding a separate device to your plan, like adding a cellular iPad or even an Apple Watch. It’s just switching your active eSIM between two iPhones. You can do this for free, now, on any carrier via Settings → Cellular — but it takes a bunch of taps, confirmation on both iPhones, and a few minutes for the carrier to register the eSIM transfer. iPhone Handoff just eliminates all the annoying friction and waiting.

Chance Miller:

As reported by CNET, AT&T seemingly has no plans to support iPhone Handoff.

Previously:

• iPhone Duo

Alexander Cohen:

The Post reported that UK security officials had issued such a TCN, in secret, in January 2025, requesting that Apple create a way to access encrypted iCloud data belonging not just to UK users, but to Apple users worldwide. The chutzpah of it all was astonishing.

Apple’s position (privately, since they were prohibited from commenting publicly on the reported TCN) showed fidelity to its previous stance: deliberately weakening end-to-end encryption, for whatever purpose or for whomever the intended beneficiary, would make every user less secure. So the dispute became the UK government saying it needed access, Apple saying it couldn’t decrypt the data, and the UK effectively replying: then change the system so that you can.

[…]

Faced with a legal order that would have required it to change the security architecture on which ADP depended, Apple found a third option: stop offering the feature that made this dilemma exist in the first place. It reverted affected UK iCloud data to Standard Data Protection, where Apple does hold the keys and can respond to lawful legal process (except the baseline categories that stay end-to-end encrypted either way). This satisfied the underlying legal requirement without ever building a ‘backdoor’.

Apple said the decision to withdraw ADP in the UK left them “gravely disappointed”. There was, however, an important disclaimer. Apple only stopped allowing new UK users to turn on Advanced Data Protection.

Apple:

For users in the UK who have already enabled Advanced Data Protection, Apple will soon provide additional guidance. Apple cannot disable ADP automatically for these users. Instead, UK users will be given a period of time to disable the feature themselves to keep using their iCloud account.

I wonder whether Apple will actually lock users out of their accounts if they don’t turn off ADP or whether they’ll quietly not enforce it like with Emergency SOS via satellite.

Cohen:

In July 2026, Apple lodged a fresh complaint at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which became public the following month. Then, on the 11th of September 2026, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (a Democrat) and Republican Congressman Warren Davidson called on the UK’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal to open up its proceedings concerning Apple’s encrypted-data dispute.

[…]

On the 17th of September The Daily Telegraph reported that Apple had asked the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to remove restrictions that gag them from confirming the existence of the reported TCN.

Previously:

• UK Again Wants iCloud Backdoor
• UK Online Safety Act
• UK Backing Down on Apple Encryption Backdoor
• Apple Pulls iCloud Advanced Data Protection From UK
• UK Orders Apple to Break iCloud Advanced Data Protection

Anunciado na semana passada, o HomePod mini 2 traz algumas novidades bastante interessantes, como o suporte à Siri AI e um processador atualizado. Ainda assim, como ele se parece bastante com o seu antecessor (principalmente em termos de design), é possível que algumas pessoas ainda estejam confusas quanto às melhorias promovidas pela Apple.

Se você é uma delas, saiba que está no artigo certo! A seguir, vamos passar por todas as diferenças entre o HomePod mini de primeira geração e o HomePod mini 2 — assim, você poderá decidir qual dos dois modelos comprar ou se vale a pena trocar o seu.

Design e dimensões

Aqui você vai encontrar mais semelhanças do que diferenças entre as duas gerações da caixa de som inteligente, que contam com o mesmo visual geral, introduzido em 2020, com novas cores adicionadas em 2021 e posteriormente em 2024.

Com um corpo esférico envolto por uma malha colorida, ambos os modelos têm 84,33mm de altura e 97,9mm de largura, com diferença apenas no peso, menor no HomePod mini 2: 335g (ante os 345g do modelo de primeira geração).

Como dito, as cores do HomePod mini de primeira geração já foram atualizadas algumas vezes, e o modelo chegou a ser vendido nas opções branca, amarela, laranja, azul e meia-noite. O HomePod mini 2, por sua vez, pode ser adquirido nas cores branca, rosa, verde, azul e meia-noite.

Ambos os modelos seguem vindo com uma superfície circular retroiluminada com botões de “+” e “-” para ajuste rápido de volume.

A Apple disponibilizará o recurso Brilho do Som (Sound Glow), que faz essa superfície pulsar e brilhar em tempo real de acordo com a música que está tocando, para todos os modelos do HomePod mini e para o HomePod de segunda geração.

Tecnologia de áudio

Nesse quesito temos algumas mudanças bem curiosas de uma geração para a outra, embora pouco tenha mudado do ponto de vista de hardware.

O que ambos os modelos têm:

• Driver de alcance completo e dois radiadores passivos para graves profundos e frequências altas nítidas;
• Guia de onda acústica personalizada para um campo sonoro de 360º;
• Tecido acusticamente transparente;
• Áudio computacional para ajustes em tempo real;
• Reconhecimento de Som para alarmes de fumaça e monóxido de carbono;
• Áudio multiambiente com AirPlay;
• Compatibilidade com setups de áudio estéreo.

O que apenas o HomePod mini 2 tem:

• Compatibilidade com som surround quando emparelhado a uma Apple TV 4K;
• Pode ser usado como caixa de som para Macs;
• Chip S10.

Em termos de hardware de áudio, o HomePod mini de primeira geração leva vantagem em apenas um item: o número de microfones. Enquanto o modelo mais antigo vem com quatro microfones embutidos “para Siri em distâncias grandes”, o HomePod mini 2 vem com “apenas” três.

É possível, no entanto, que a Apple esteja compensando a ausência de um microfone no novo modelo com as novas capacidades de software viabilizadas pelo chip S10, bem mais moderno do que o S5 do HomePod mini de primeira geração.

Fontes e controles de áudio

Aqui, nada mudou. Ambos os modelos podem reproduzir áudio das seguintes fontes:

• Apple Music;
• Compras do iTunes;
• Biblioteca de Música do iCloud com uma assinatura do Apple Music ou do iTunes Match;
• Serviços de música de terceiros;
• Estações do Apple Music Radio ou episódios sob demanda;
• Estações de rádio do TuneIn, do iHeartRadio ou do Audacy;
• Apple Podcasts;
• Resumos de notícias;
• AirPlay (iPhone, iPad, iPod touch, Apple TV 4K ou Mac).

Também é possível controlar a reprodução ao:

• Tocar uma vez na parte superior para reproduzir/pausar;
• Tocar duas vezes seguidas para pular;
• Tocar três vezes seguidas para voltar;
• Tocar e segurar para invocar a Siri;
• Tocar nos botões de “+” e “-” para aumentar ou diminuir o volume.

Siri

O HomePod mini 2 vence com facilidade nesse quesito: é o único compatível com a versão “turbinada” da assistente virtual da Apple, a Siri AI.

De acordo com a Apple, além de ajudar em tarefas mais simples como enviar mensagens, controlar a reprodução e configurar lembretes, a Siri AI também pode conversar mais naturalmente, responder dúvidas sobre o mundo real com base em buscas na web e recomendar músicas de maneira mais precisa. Ela ainda leva mais o contexto em conta e processa a maioria das solicitações no próprio dispositivo.

O HomePod mini de primeira geração segue com a versão antiga da Siri, capaz de lidar com comandos mais básicos.

Conectividade e sensores

Tanto o HomePod mini de primeira geração quanto o HomePod mini 2 são compatíveis com descoberta ponto a ponto, para acesso fácil de convidados, e com redes Thread, além de contarem com um chip de banda ultralarga para recursos que dependem da proximidade de outros aparelhos, como iPhones.

Já o modelo mais antigo tem Wi-Fi 4 (802.11n) e Bluetooth 5, enquanto a nova versão conta com Wi-Fi 6E (802.11ax) e Bluetooth 6. Ambos os modelos vêm com sensores de temperatura e umidade.

Preço e disponibilidade

Já disponível em pré-venda, o HomePod mini 2 será lançado em 30 de outubro por US$150 (US$20 a mais do que o modelo anterior) nos Estados Unidos e em outros países selecionados.

Assim como seu antecessor, o novo HomePod mini também segue sem uma previsão de lançamento no Brasil ou em Portugal — quem sabe isso mude com o lançamento dos sistemas 27.2 e com a chegada da Siri AI em português.

Ambos os HomePods mini vêm com um cabo USB-C e um adaptador bivolt de 20W na caixa, além da documentação regulamentar, é claro.

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