Neil Fraser (via Hacker News):
Nearly twenty-five years ago I registered neil.fraser.name to provide a stable presence on the Internet. It has been the home of this website, my email address, and a server for APIs.
[…]
On 15 April 2026 Verisign proposed the destruction of the entire 3rd level of the ‘.name’ hierarchy in order to simplify their administration. Astonishingly, on 28 July 2026 ICANN approved this action.
[…]
One of my original reasons for choosing ‘.name’ was that it was run by Global Name Registry -- more specifically, it was not run by Verisign. I had history with Verisign and did not trust them. Unfortunately, Verisign acquired Global Name Registry a few years later.
He’s going to lose his site and e-mail address, and someone else could potentially register the domain and hijack his accounts.
Previously:
Exchange Web Services (EWS) is approaching end of service in Exchange Online. We first announced this change was coming in 2018, when we announced that Exchange Web Services (EWS) will no longer receive functionality updates. In 2023, we announced that EWS will be disabled in Exchange Online in October 2026.
Today we’re announcing we will use a phased, admin controllable disablement plan that starts in October 2026 and concludes with a complete shutdown of EWS in 2027.
Microsoft announced the upcoming end of service for Exchange Web Services (EWS) in Exchange Online. Apple is actively working with Microsoft to update Mail, Calendar, Contacts, Notes, and Reminders to use the Graph API in a future update to macOS 27, including a declarative configuration for device management services.
I’ve been eagerly awaiting Apple’s migration to Microsoft’s newer Graph API because EWS support in Apple Mail has long been buggy. It seems to have gotten worse in recent months, presumably due to server side changes as Microsoft prepares to shut it all down. Unfortunately, Apple is not as far along in the transition as I’d expected.
Jonathan Harbourne (and, alas, Claude):
What made a Mac feel like a Mac at work was the software that came with it. Mail that you could actually scan. A Calendar that was a separate application, so it could live permanently on a second screen instead of hiding behind a tab. Quick Look. Smart mailboxes. Spotlight that found things. Share sheets that worked everywhere. The system behaving as one coherent thing rather than a collection of vendor silos.
[…]
iOS and iPadOS Mail no longer depend on EWS. macOS Mail still does. Same company, same deadline, same protocol, and only one of the two platforms got the work done in time. Microsoft ended up writing the guidance Apple should have written, telling administrators in February that Apple Mail for Mac users would have to switch to Outlook until the applications were updated. […] Apple had years. It had a public deadline. It had, by Microsoft’s own account, one of the most widely used EWS applications in existence. And it let the clock run out.
[…]
Somewhere in every one of these migrations is a line in a change log that reads “users to move to Outlook”, as though a mail client were a fungible commodity, like swapping a stapler. […] This is not the death of the Mac at work. […] It is the death of the Mac experience at work.
Outlook for Mac feels very different from Apple Mail, and users are being squeezed from the Microsoft side, too. Microsoft will be ending the transition to New Outlook in October, but the new version is still missing many features that were present in Legacy Outlook (as well as Apple Mail). Microsoft had long promised that it would implement AppleScript in New Outlook before dropping support for the old version, but last week it changed course:
AppleScript workflows vary widely across organizations and often depend on behaviors from the classic app that don’t exist in the New Outlook. Because these patterns can’t be standardized, full compatibility isn’t feasible. We have decided not to move forward with this feature. We apologize for the inconvenience.
Back to Harbourne:
Access only ratchets one way. Mail was allowed because it worked, quietly, for years, over a protocol nobody was auditing. It has now been formally removed under a named cybersecurity policy. Getting it back would require someone in a security function to write a positive case for re-admitting a broad-permission third-party client to the corporate mail estate, and then put their name on it. Nobody’s career improves by doing that. Saying no costs nothing and is never wrong in hindsight.
So if Apple ships Graph support in Mail next year, the people who lost it will not get it back. The door didn’t swing shut. It was bolted, and the reason it was bolted is now written down in a policy document that will outlive the protocol that prompted it.
Apple has no leverage to change that, either. The organisations deploying Macs by the tens of thousands are not Apple partners in any meaningful sense. They are customers who buy boxes. There is no relationship to call on, no joint roadmap, no account team, nobody at Apple whose job it is to notice that a hundred thousand people just lost Mail.
October is when administrators will have to opt back into allowing EWS for a few more months, but some (like Harbourne’s) will be switching off support sooner.
Apple Mail and Outlook aren’t the only options, though. MailMaven supports both Graph and AppleScript.
Previously:
Update (2026-08-21): See also: Reddit and Mac Power Users.
Update (2026-08-24): See also: Mac Power Users.
Previously:
Joseph Cox (MacRumors, Hacker News):
A vulnerability in Apple’s “Hide My Email” tool lets almost anyone discover a person’s real email address that is supposed to be hidden by the feature, and Apple has failed to fix it for more than a year, according to a security researcher and 404 Media’s own tests.
[…]
“Apple Hide My Email is leaking email addresses that are supposed to be hidden. We reported the issue and replication instructions to Apple over a year ago. We don’t know why it hasn’t been fixed, but we don’t feel comfortable waiting any longer. Hide My Email users deserve to know that it may be possible for attackers to discover their hidden email addresses,” Tyler Murphy, the co-founder of EasyOptOuts, which discovered and reported the issue to Apple, told 404 Media.
“Free, publicly accessible people-search sites make it easy to link an email address to other personal details, so people relying on Hide My Email for safety may be at risk,” Murphy added.
[…]
To test the issue I generated a new Hide My Email address and provided it to Murphy. Around five minutes later, he replied with my real email address linked to my Apple account which was supposed to be hidden.
Murphy said that he reported the issue to Apple in June of last year, and the company told him it was looking into it. Apple said it had been fixed in March of this year, but Murphy found that wasn’t the case. He again contacted Apple, with the company saying that it would appreciate him not revealing the existence of the flaw until it had been resolved.
Apple then said it planned to address the issue in June, but since it still hasn’t been fixed[…]
March 19, 2026: Using the reproduction instructions from our initial report, we determined that the vulnerabilities hadn’t been fixed.
May 22, 2026: We realized that the vulnerabilities may have greater severity and scope than we thought initially and reported this to Apple. Apple never acknowledged the report of increased severity.
June 30, 2026: Apple again reported that the vulnerabilities were fixed and asked us to verify. We determined that the vulnerabilities hadn’t been fixed.
This is every fucking Feedback I file.
Not good. Especially the “We reported the issue and replication instructions to Apple over a year ago” part.
This is becoming a pattern. At least Apple still allows third-party e-mail providers.
Very few details are available right now. I have seen speculation that the original email address is revealed when someone replies using their hidden email address, but the impression I get from Cox’s reporting is that no user interaction is necessary[…]
[…]
I am also unclear about how, as of May, the EasyOptOuts guys found the “vulnerability may have greater severity and scope” than initially reported. Ominous, though.
Previously:
Update (2026-07-13): Jeff Johnson:
I don’t know whether I’ve accidentally stumbled upon that vulnerability, or perhaps in this case the Hide My Email user just messed up in some way, but I’ve definitely discovered a bizarre and troubling Hide My Email bug in Mail app (on macOS Sequoia 15.7.7).
[…]
Bizarrely, however, Mail app displayed an alert that I’ve never seen before, “This message was forwarded to you by Hide My Email,” despite the fact that I have previously received many emails from people using Hide My Email.
[…]
- Why I am seeing two different
@icloud.comemail addresses, one of which appears to be the sender’s unhidden address?- Why are the
To:andFrom:fields in my reply disabled?- Why is my reply not from my
@underpassapp.comemail address but rather displayed falsely as from the sender’s@icloud.comaddress and really from my unrelated Apple Account address?
Update (2026-07-16): Joe Rossignol:
Apple this week was sued over a reported “Hide My Email” flaw that could expose a user’s real email address. The proposed class action lawsuit alleges that Apple violated California’s false advertising law and other consumer protection statutes by knowingly offering a feature that does not work as advertised.
This is interesting in that the June 2025 bug report is the evidence that Apple “knew” the feature didn’t work, while “Apple continued to represent to consumers that Hide My Email would actually hide users’ email.” How long are they supposed to get to fix a bug?
Update (2026-07-20): Jeff Johnson:
The misleading user interface elements in Mail app are a bug, but by themselves they’re not a vulnerability. The vulnerability is that when I send a reply to my maliciously crafted email, my Apple account email address is disclosed in the “From” field of the sent reply! In other words, the Mail app interface lies, fails to show the true sent value of the “From” field.
There are a couple of crazy aspects to this information disclosure vulnerability:
- It does not require that the victim actually use Hide My Email! I never use it. As I mentioned in my previous blog post, I don’t even have an
icloud.comemail account.- It does not matter which of the victim’s email accounts receives the email from the attacker. If your Apple account email address is
a@foo.com, but you receive a maliciously crafted email addressed tob@bar.com, Mail app will still send your reply froma@foo.com, thereby disclosing your Apple account address.
Update (2026-07-21): Juli Clover:
Apple addressed a vulnerability in Hide My Email that exposed a user's real email address, reports 404 Media. Apple told the site the issue was fully fixed in a patch released on July 3.
[…]
While the bug has now been addressed, email logs that pre-date the fix could still expose user email addresses.
Update (2026-07-22): See also: Hacker News.
It appears that the vulnerability I discovered, and which still occurs, is different from the vulnerability reported by others[…]
Later this summer, Apple will unify the email domains used by Sign in with Apple and iCloud+ Hide My Email under a single, shared domain: private.icloud.com.
New addresses generated for both features will be issued on the new domain.
[…]
Existing addresses on the legacy domains will continue to work and forward mail to users without interruption.
It’s unclear to me what the benefit of this is. Is there a reason to migrate legacy addresses?
Arseniy Shestakov (Hacker News):
This makes it much easier to ban all aliases without affecting non-relay mailboxes on iCloud mail.
This is certainly a big hit for iCloud privacy, since some plausible deniability together with Apple’s backing made banning iCloud aliases costly. But now a lot of services will just refuse to accept these emails, just like what happens with free temporary mailboxes.
But my retort is that a service that won’t accept these email addresses is one that I probably don’t want to have anything to do with. The only reason not to accept
private.icloud.comemail addresses is if you want to do something invasive with users’ actual email addresses.
The main problem I have with Hide My Email is that some customers use it and then have no way to look up their purchase info via e-mail because they don’t know which address they used. Of course, I wouldn’t reject such addresses, but I wonder if services will start using the new domain to recognize that Hide My Email is being used and nudge the user to provide a different address.
Previously:
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